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Hume's second definition of causation described effects as being 
counterfactually dependent upon their causes: one 'object' caused another 
"where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed."1 
This definition lay dormant for more than two centuries before it was 
revived and given its best known formulation by David Lewis.2 Several 
years ago, however, an alternative analysis of causation using 
countcrfactuals was suggested by Marshall Swain.3 I wish to examine 
Swain's account critically as a potential alternative to Lewis's. 
Swain's analysis begins with some important definitions:4 
(D1) The proposition that if A were true, then C would be true is true at 
a world 10 iff: 
ci t her (1) there arc no possible ^-worlds 
or (2) some /I-world where C holds is closer to w than is any 
/1-world where C docs not hold. 
(D3) Where c and e are occurrcnt events, e depends counterfactually on c 
iff: if c had not occurred, then e would not have occurred. 
(D4) c and e are distinct events iff: 
(1) c is not identical to e; and 
(2) neither event is a constituent of the other.5 
(D5) Where c and e arc occurrcnt events, e depends causally on c iff: 
(1) c and e arc distinct events; and 
(2) if c had not occurred, then e would not have occurred. 
1 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section VII. 
2 David Lewis, "Causation," Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 556-67. 
3 Marshall Swain, "A Counterfactual Analysis of Event Causation," 
Philosophical Studies 34 (1978): 1-19. Swain's recent position is 
essentially no different from that presented in the original article. 
4 Ibid., pp. 3-5. 
5 Swain gives a more detailed account of event distinction in "Causation 
and Distinct Events," in Peter van Inwagcn, cd.. Time and Cause, 
(Dordrecht: Keidel, 1980), 155-169. 
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(D6) Where c, d\,...., rfn i is a sequence of occur rent events (but not 
necessarily a temporal sequence, and where c and e may be the 
only members), this sequence is a causal chain iff: 
(1) d\ depends causally on c; and 
(2)</2 depends causally on d\; and... 
(n) dn depends causally on dn.\; and 
(n+l)e depends causally on dn. 
Swain suggests the following as a first approximation to an analysis of 
causation: 
(D7) Where c and c are specific events that occurred, c is a cause of c iff: 
there is a causal chain of occurrcnt events from c to t. 
He argues, however, that (D7) is inadequate for two reasons. The first is 
that it docs not guarantee the asymmetry of causation. If c is a cause of e, 
then e can not be a cause of c. (D7) seems to violate this principle. If e had 
not occurred, then some cause of e must also have failed to occur. If c is the 
cause which would fail to occur, there will be a chain of causal dependence 
from e to c; so according to (D7), c caused e and e caused c. Lewis argues that 
the relation of counterfactual dependence is asymmetric, and that causal 
asymmetry follows as a corollary. According to Lewis, the closest possible 
world in which e does not occur will be one in which all of the causes of e 
occui anyway. In his paper 'Counterfactual Dependence and Time's 
Arrow,'6 Lewis offers criteria for judging, of two worlds w\ and 102, which is 
closer to the actual world w. His criteria, however, do not guarantee that 
w\ will be closer to w than is u>2 if u>2 violates the laws of w and w-[ docs 
not. Thus, the closet possible world in which a particular event e does not 
occur may (and typically will) be one in which the laws of nature of the 
actual world are violated. Swain rejects this view of countcrfactuals; he 
argues that the candidates for being the possible world closest to w will be 
ones in which the natural laws of w are not violated.7 As a result, Swain's 
relation of counterfactual dependence will not, in general, be asymmetric. 
Swain tries to capture the asymmetry of causation by imposing two 
additional conditions on definition (D7):* 
(D7') Where c and e are specific events that occurred, c is causally prior 
toe iff: 
(i) there is a causal chain of occurrcnt events from c to e; 
6 Lewis, "Counterfactual Dependence and TimcHs Arrow," Nous 13 (1979): 
455-476. 
7 Sec Swain, "A Counterfactual Analysis," pp. 7-10. 
8 Swain, "A Counterfactual Analysis," p. 11. 
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(i i) where w\isa world in which c occurs and e docs not occur, 
and w is the actual world, w\ would only have to have 
been different from w in the following respect: some event a 
(other than c) which occurs in w and upon which e depends 
causally in w fails to occur in wy, 
(i i i) where 102 is a world in which e occurs and c docs not occur, 
and w is the actual world, 102 would have to be different 
from w in at least the following respects: (1) some event / 
(other than e) which occurs in to and upon which c depends 
causally in w fails to occur in 102; and (2) some event g occurs 
in W2 such that e is not causally dependent upon g'nxw but e 
is causally dependent upon g in u>2.9 
Informally, c can be a cause of e, but not vice versa, if there is a world in 
which c occurred, but e didn't, which is closer to the actual world than is 
any in which e occurred and c didn't, where the distance between two 
worlds is measured by the number of events that occur in one world but not 
both. 1 0 This is intended to rule out the possibility of c and e being treated as 
causes of one another. 
The second problem with (D7), according to Swain, is that it will fail 
in cases of causal ovcrdetermination: cases where two (or more) events, 
each one sufficient by itself to cause e, both occur, each having an equal 
claim to being a cause of e. It is not true of any overdctcrmining cause, that 
had it not occurred, the effect would not have occurred. An example would 
be a man's being killed by being simultaneously shot through the heart by 
two bullets: had cither bullet not been shot, he still would have died. 
Causal ovcrdetermination must not be confused with causal preemption. In 
cases of causal preemption, two (or more) events occur, each sufficient by 
itself to cause e, but where the occurrence of one prevents the others from 
actually having a hand in bringing about the effect. (D7) is equipped to 
treat cases of causal preemption,11 but in cases of ovcrdetermination, it runs 
into trouble. Swain's strategy for tackling the problem of 
9 A printing error in the original article caused the last clause to misread: 
"some event g occurs in iv2 such that e is not causally dependent upon /in w 
but e is causally dependent upon/in vq." 
1 0 In this informal paraphrase, I ignore difficulties in interpreting the 
modal expressions "would have to be different" and "would only have to 
have been different". Since definition (D7") already involves 
quantification over possible worlds, it is to be hoped that these modal 
expressions can be eliminated in favor of quantified expressions. Swain's 
intentions arc not entirely clear on this point, however. 
1 1 See, e.g. Lewis, "Causation," p. 191; Swain, "A Countcrfactual Analysis," 
pp. 13-4. 
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ovcrdctormination rests on the following observation. Suppose two events, c 
and d, causally ovcrdetermine the event e. In the actual world, neither c 
nor d is causally prior to e. If d had not occurred, however, c would have 
been causally prior to e by virtue of a mechanism or process which actually 
occurred. This is in contrast with the case where c is preempted by d: in this 
case, c, in d's absence, would have been causally prior to e by virtue of a 
mechanism which did not actually occur. Swain's account of 
ovcrdctcrmination transforms this observation into an alternative set of 
conditions sufficient for two events to be related as cause and effect. Adding 
his account of ovcrdctermination to his account of asymmetry yields 
Swain's full account of causation:12 
(D7") Where c and e are specific events that occurred, c was a cause of e 
iff: 
Either (A) (i), (ii), and (iii), as above in (D7*); Or 
(B) Some set of events D=[d\, d%<*n) occurred (possibly having 
only one member) such that 
(a) If c had not occurred, and if any member d\ of D had 
occurred, but no other members of D had occurred, and 
if e had occurred anyway, then there would have 
been a causal chain from dx to e consisting wholly of 
occurrcnt events, and d\ would have been causally 
prior tor; and 
(b) If no member of D had occurred, and if c and e had 
occurred anyway, then there would have been a 
causal chain from c to e consisting wholly of occurrcnt 
events, and c would have been causally prior to e. 
Unfortunately, the seeming advantages of Swain's revisions to (D7) 
vanish under careful examination. I will present several examples where 
Swain's analysis fails to correctly diagnose the causal situation.13 Some 
win exploit technical details in Swain's account. It will be argued, 
however, that the difficulties raised by these examples can not be 
circumvented by severing the relevant details from the rest of the account. 
Other examples will point to more general difficulties with Swain's 
analysis. 
12Swain, "A Counterfactual Analysis," p. 16. 
1 3 It deserves to be mentioned that Martin Bun/.l ("Causal Preemption and 
Counterfactuals," Philosophical Studies 37 (1980): 115-124) and Wayne 
Davis ("Swain's Counterfactual Analysis of Causation," Philosophical 
Studies 38 (1980): 169-176) have suggested counterexamples to Swain's 
account. I believe these counterexamples may be handled by 
straightforward and natural revisions, but I will not discuss this issue here. 
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The first telling problem is that according to Swain's analysis, there 
arc no causes; at any rate, the existence of causes implies a restriction on 
possible worlds which seems unwarranted. As a preliminary, note that 
while condition (D7") is disjunctive, disjunct (0) is parasitic upon the 
condition described in disjunct (A). The clause "c would have been causally 
prior to e" in (D7")(D)(b) entails that there is some possible world w (not 
necessarily the actual world) in which c and e satisfy the relation of causal 
priority defined in (D7*) and repeated in (D7")(A). It follows that if c docs 
not stand in the relation of causal priority to e in any possible world, then 
both disjuncts of (D7") will fail. 
Now suppose that c and e arc any two occurrcnt events-we may 
suppose, to make the counterexample more vivid, that c actually causes e. 
If c is a cause of e, according to Swain's analysis, there must be some 
possible world in which c is causally prior to e. That is, there must be some 
world, w, with respect to which c and e satisfy condition (D7*). Clause 
(iii) of (D7*) asserts: "where u>2 is a world in which e occurs, and c docs not 
occur,...u»2 would have to be different from u> in at least the following 
I respect |:...some event g occurs in v>2 such that e is not causally dependent 
upon g in w but e is causally dependent upon g in u>2." It is easy, however, to 
construct a world in which e occurs and c doesn't, which docs not have such 
an additional causal dependence. Let 102 be the world which differs from w 
in these respects: 1) c fails to occur in w; and 2) e is brought about by two 
overdetermining causes (say, d and /), neither one of which occurs in w. 
(Sec diagram 1.) 
Diagram 1 
w 102 
e e 
c d f 
Since the events d and / over determine e, e is causally dependent on neither 
of then, so condition (D7')(iii) fails. (Recall that causal dependence, as 
defined in (D5), requires counterfactual dependence, which is absent in 
cases of causal overdetermination.) There is a similar counterexample if e 
is brought about by a pre-empting cause in ur?. 
No argument has been offered fur the conclusion that 1^2 is a possible 
world, but it is hard to sec what might disqualify it. Swain allows that an 
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effect may be brought about by different causes in different possible worlds, 
and he admits that an effect may be brought about by overdetcrmining 
causes. 102 simply combines these two possibilities. 
One possible solution to this problem immediately suggests itself: 
allow for the possibility of disjunctive events. In the example above, d-or-f 
could be considered as a single event. If this event had not occurred-if 
neither d nor/ had occurrcd-in u>2, then e would not have occurred. With 
this ontological addition the counterexample vanishes. This would patch 
up the problem, but it would raise a new problem: Swain would owe an 
account of disjunctive events. Simply admitting disjunctive events without 
some modification of the theory would lead to undesirable results. For 
example, suppose my striking the cue ball on a particular occasion caused 
the sinking of the eight ball. Then Swain's current account would treat the 
disjunctive event of my-striking-the-cue-ball-or-a-nuclear-holocaust as a 
cause of the eight ball's going into the side pocket; this disjunctive event 
would also satisfy Swain's criterion (D7*). This is certainly odd: had the 
disjunctive event occurred by virtue of the occurrence of the second disjunct -
the nuclear holocaust—the eight ball would have disintegrated rather 
than have gone into the side pocket. Thus, if Swain is to modify his account 
by admitting disjunctive events, he will have to make many further 
revisions. Ad hominem. Swain's choice to treat causal ovcrdetermination 
by adding disjunct (D) to (D7'), rather than by admitting disjunctive 
events, shows an unwillingness to make these revisions. 
There arc, of course, many more revisions to (D7') which might be 
attempted. The problems uncovered by the above counterexample, 
however, are deep enough to raise doubts about the possibility of any 
successful revision. It may well be that the only revision of (D7')(iii)(2) 
that will save the causal phenomena is the replacement of "e is causally 
dependent upon g in 102" with "e is caused by g in u>2" or some cxtcnsional 
equivalent. It seems at least prima facie likely that in order for e to be 
brought about in the absence of one of its actual (non-ovcrdctcrmining) 
causes, it would be both necessary and sufficient to have some event be a 
new cause of it. Of course, to make this modification would be to flirt with 
vicious circularity. Swain himself foreshadows this difficulty: 
...to imagine e without c, you need to imagine that 
something prevented c from occurring and something else 
caused e, but to get c without e you only need to imagine 
that something prevented c from causing e. Of course, this 
way of putting the matter neatly begs the question 
concerning the causal facts in this case, but the difference 
noted provides us with the key to capturing asymmetry.14 
14 Swain, "A Countcrfactual Analysis," p. 11. 
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If c had not occurred,/ would have caused g, which would have caused e. As 
it happened, however, c prevented g from occurring, thus breaking the link 
from / to e. The success of Swain's account depends on there being a chain of 
counterfactual dependence from c to e. It is not true that if c had not 
occurred, then e would not have occurred; it is alleged, however, that if c 
had not occurred, then d would not have occurred, and that had d not 
occurred, e would not have occurred (the causal chain from / toe having 
already been preempted due to c's preventing g). The success of the latter 
counterfactual, however, demands that the counterfactual 'If d had not 
occurred, c would have occurred anyway' be true: a dangerous assumption if 
the actual laws of nature must hold in the closest possible world in which d 
fails to occur. Some cause of d must fail to occur in this closest possible 
world, and there is no guarantee that c will not be this disappearing cause. 
Pushing the above problems aside, wc may now focus our attention on 
the second disjunct of (D7"), which gives Swain's account of 
overdetcrmination. There is a serious flaw with this account: it grants 
preempted causes the status of genuine causes. Suppose that d caused e, but 
that c would have caused e had d not occurred. (Sec diagram 3.) 
Our counterexample involving an ovcrdctermincd event in one possible 
world satisfies Swain's informal, circular criterion for c to be a cause of e, 
but not his formal, non-circular one. This suggests that the circularity is not 
so easily avoided. 
I wish to discuss one final flaw which Swain's account of causal 
asymmetry shares with any counterfactual analysis of causation which 
disqualifies worlds which violate the actual laws of nature when 
evaluating counterfactuals. Such accounts rob counterfactual theories of 
their ability to treat cases of causal preemption. Suppose, for instance, that 
c caused e via d, preempting the causal chain from / to e via g. (Sec diagram 
2.) 
Diagram 2 
On dose inspection, wc sec that c and e satisfy disjunct (B) of (DT): 
Consider the set D=[d). 
(a) If c had not occurred, and if d (the only member of D) had 
occurred, and if e had occurred anyway, then there would 
have been a causal chain from d to e consisting wholly of 
occurrcnt events, and d would have been causally prior to 
e. This follows directly from the hypothesis the d did, in 
fact, cause e. 
(b) If no member of D had occurred, and if c and e had 
occurred anyway, then (i) there would have been a causal 
chain from c to e consisting wholly of occurrcnt events, 
and (ii) c would have been causally prior to e. Clause (ii) 
is satisfied by hypothesis: if d had not occurred, c would 
have caused e. 
Swain evidently wants to prevent the analysis from going through by 
saying that (b)(i) is not satisfied: since c was, in actuality, preempted, 
there is no causal chain from c to e consisting wholly of occurrcnt events. 
Here Swain would be simply mistaken. There is such a causal chain, 
namely the sequence c, e: in the absence of d, e is causally dependent upon c, 
and both c and e arc occurrcnt events. The fact that in the absence of d, the 
events leading from c to e did not all occur in the actual world does not 
affect the status of the causal chain c, e. Clearly, Swain's notion of a causal 
chain consisting wholly of occurrcnt events is a much weaker one than it 
first appeared: it docs not come close to the intuitive notion of an occurrcnt 
causal mechanism or process which motivated Swain's account of causal 
ovcrdetermination. While Swain's strategy is intuitively comprehensible, 
it is hard to see how it can be explicated in Swain's vocabulary of causal 
chains.15 
15 Peter Mcnzics ("Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: A Critique 
of Lewis," Philosophy of Science 56 (1989): 642-663) offers an objection to 
Lewis's account which is analogous to that raised in this paragraph. 
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I share Swain's discomfort with Lewis's counterfactual theory of 
causation. Swain's goal, a counterfactual theory of causation in which the 
actual laws of nature arc held sacred when evaluating the possible world 
closest to the actual one, is an admirable one. The failure of his account to 
provide a sound alternative to Lewis's, however, suggests that Swain's 
admirable goal is also an impossible one. 1 6 
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